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Abstract
We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy
(PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with n agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware
protocols, where the designer has prior access to the network structure and can also increase the total
cost of an edge (overcharging), and we study classes of games with concave or convex cost functions. We
first consider concave cost functions and our main result is a cost-sharing protocol for symmetric games
on directed acyclic graphs that achieves a PoA of 2+ε for some arbitrary small positive ε, which improves
to 1 + ε for games with at least two players. We also achieve a PoA of 1 for series-parallel graphs and
show that no protocol can achieve a PoA better than Ω(
√
n) for multicast games. We then also consider
convex cost functions and prove analogous results for series-parallel networks and multicast games, as
well as a lower bound of Ω(n) for the PoA on directed acyclic graphs without the use of overcharging.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the classic model of network cost-sharing games introduced by Anshelevich et al.
[2008] and Chen et al. [2010], where a set of n agents need to use a path that connects a designated source
to a sink in a given graph G. Each edge of the graph is characterized by a cost function, and the cost of
each edge needs to be distributed among the agents that use it in their chosen paths. Anshelevich et al.
[2008] considered cost functions that are constant, i.e., independent of the number of agents that use the
edge, and assumed that the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users (which is known as the
Shapley cost-sharing protocol). This gave rise to a, now, very well-studied class of games where each agent
strategically chooses a path that minimizes her share of the total cost, anticipating the strategic choices of
the other agents. It is well-known that the Nash equilibria of this game can have a high social cost, and a
lot of subsequent work has focused on evaluating exactly how much greater this cost can be compared to
the optimal social cost.
Deviating from this line of work which assumed that the cost-sharing protocol for each edge is predeter-
mined to be the Shapley protocol, Chen et al. [2010] instead approached the problem from the perspective
of a designer and asked a compelling question: can we design a better cost-sharing protocol? In particular, if
the designer of a network wishes to minimize the social cost in equilibrium, what cost-sharing protocol should
she choose? Focusing on graphs with constant cost functions, they proposed a list of desirable properties
that the cost-sharing protocols should satisfy, they provided characterizations of these protocols, and proved
tight bounds regarding their performance. Following the same research agenda, von Falkenhausen and Harks
[2013] provided tight bounds for more general cost functions, but for more restricted network structures,
namely for scheduling games. Our work is motivated by the same question and the main differences are
two-fold: i) we consider more general classes of cost functions than Chen et al. [2010] and more general
network structures than von Falkenhausen and Harks [2013], and ii) we focus on resource-aware protocols
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which were recently introduced by Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [2016] and studied by Christodoulou et al.
[2017].
The class of resource-aware protocols provide a refinement regarding the amount of information available
to the protocol and they provide a middle-ground between the two extreme information models that were
studied in the past. Note that the amount of information that is available to the protocol plays a central
role. For instance, can the decisions of the protocol regarding how to distribute the cost of an edge depend
on the structure of the graph G beyond that edge? Can they depend on the set of agents that are using
the network at any given time? The more information the protocol has access to regarding the state of the
system, the greater the ability of the designer to reach efficient outcomes. Most of the prior work focused on
either omniscient protocols that have full knowledge of the instance (the structure of the graph and its cost
functions as well the set of agents that are using the system), or oblivious protocols that have no knowledge
of the instance, except the set of users who use the corresponding edge. Previous work has also referred to
these protocols as “non-uniform” and “uniform”, respectively.
These assumptions lie at two extremes of the information spectrum. The former applies to a very static,
or centralized, system where each edge always has access to up-to-date information regarding the users and
the graph G. The latter, on the other hand, is very pessimistic, assuming that the cost-sharing decisions
of each edge need to be oblivious to the state of the system. The resource-aware model strikes a balance
between these two extremes by assuming that the protocol of each edge knows graph G and the edge cost
functions, but is aware only of the set of users who chose to utilize that particular edge. This model is
more realistic than the oblivious one when the network does not change often, which is the case in many real
systems. In that case, the structure of the graph can be used to inform the design of the cost-sharing protocol
of each edge and this protocol needs only to be updated when the structure of the network is changed. Of
course, the fact that a resource-aware protocol has additional information compared to an oblivious one is
only interesting if this can lead to improved outcomes. Understanding the ways in which this information
can be useful is one of the central goals of this paper.
In designing cost-sharing protocols, the goal is to ensure that the worst-case equilibria of the induced
game approximate the optimal social cost within some small factor. We measure the performance of these
protocols using the worst-case price of anarchy (PoA) measure, i.e., the ratio of the social cost in the worst
equilibrium over that in the optimal solution. Essentially, once the designer selects the protocol on each edge,
then an adversary chooses the requested subset of agents so that the PoA of the induced game is maximized.
Overcharging. In accordance with some of the recent work on resource-aware protocols Christodoulou
et al. [2017], we also consider protocols that use overcharging. This is in contrast to some of the prior work
(e.g., Chen et al. [2010],von Falkenhausen and Harks [2013] and Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [2016]) which
was restricted to budget-balanced protocols, i.e., protocols such that the costs of the users using some edge
add up to exactly the cost of the edge. Our protocols can instead choose to charge the users additional costs
in order to dissuade them from using some of the edges. It is important to note that, once we introduce
increased costs in our protocols, we compare the performance of the equilibria in the induced game with the
increased costs to the original optimal solution with the initial cost functions. Therefore, using this technique
requires a careful trade-off between the benefit of improved incentives and the drawback of penalties suffered.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper we provide several upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy (PoA) of interesting classes
of network cost-sharing games. We consider symmetric games, where the source and sink of every agent is
the same, as well as multicast games, where the sink is the same for every agent, but the source may be
different. In terms of the graphs that we consider, we go beyond parallel link networks and consider directed
acyclic graphs as well as series-parallel graphs. Finally, we consider different types of functions that describe
the costs of the network edges, and we group our results based on whether these functions are concave or
convex.
It is for concave cost functions that we get the main result of the paper (see Section 4). That is, a
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resource-aware cost-sharing protocol, the Never-Walk-Alone protocol, which guarantees a PoA of 2 + ε for
symmetric games on arbitrary directed acyclic graphs and some arbitrarily small constant ε > 0. In fact,
for instances that involve more than one agent the PoA of this protocol drops to 1 + ε for an arbitrarily
small constant ε. We show that every game that this protocol gives rise to is guaranteed to possess a pure
Nash equilibrium, and every such equilibrium corresponds to an optimal assignment of agents to paths.
The success of this protocol in such a large class of instances crucially depends on the fact that the cost-
sharing decisions depend on the structure of the graph, and we leverage this power in a novel way, using
careful overcharging in order to avoid suboptimal equilibria despite the decentralized nature of the protocol.
Apart from this result, we also provide an alternative protocol that achieves a PoA of 1 for all symmetric
instances with series-parallel graphs and strictly concave costs, without using any overcharging; with a minor
amount of overcharging, this protocol can also be adapted to get a PoA of 1 + ε even for weakly concave
costs (Section 5). We complement these positive results with two impossibility results for the class of (non-
symmetric) multicast games, for which we show that no resource-aware protocol can achieve a PoA better
than Ω(n) without overcharging and Ω(
√
n) even with overcharging (Section 6).
We then transition to convex cost functions in Section 7. We show that for symmetric games a simple
protocol can achieve a PoA of 1 for series-parallel graphs, but for directed acyclic graphs no budget-balanced
protocol can achieve a PoA better than Ω(n). Also, for multicast games, we show that no protocol can
achieve a PoA better than Ω(
√
n), even if it uses overcharging.
2 Related Work
The papers that are most closely related to ours are that of Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [2016] and
Christodoulou et al. [2017], which were the first ones to study the design of resource-aware protocols for
network cost-sharing games. Christodoulou and Sgouritsa [2016] considered constant cost functions, as in
Chen et al. [2010], and they showed that for outerplanar graphs there exists a resource-aware protocol that
performs better than any oblivious one. On the negative side, they showed that for general graphs the best
protocol performs asymptotically the same with the best oblivious one. Christodoulou et al. [2017] consid-
ered more general classes of cost functions beyond constant ones, as in von Falkenhausen and Harks [2013],
but were restricted to parallel link networks. In this paper we combine the strengths of these two papers by
studying general classes of cost functions for larger classes of networks beyond parallel links.
Apart from the aforementioned papers, there are are several others that also focus on the design and
analysis of cost-sharing protocols. Harks and von Falkenhausen [2014] applied cost-sharing protocols to
capacitated facility location games and, among other results, showed that omniscient protocols can achieve
efficiency for convex cost functions and general strategy spaces. Marden and Wierman [2013] studied multiple
cost-sharing protocols in a model of utility maximization instead of cost-minimization. Gopalakrishnan
et al. [2014] provide a complete characterization of the space of oblivious cost-sharing protocols that always
guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium and showed that it corresponds to the set of generalized
weighted Shapley value protocols. Leveraging this characterization, Gkatzelis et al. [2016] analyzed this
family of cost-sharing protocols and showed that the unweighted Shapley value achieves the optimal price of
anarchy guarantees for network cost-sharing games. Also, Harks and Miller [2011] studied the performance of
several cost-sharing protocols in a slightly modified setting, where each player declares a different demand for
each resource. Christodoulou et al. [2016] studied network design games with constant cost functions under
the Bayesian setting, where the position of the players’ sources on the graph is drawn from a distribution
over all vertices. They considered overcharging, where they could use any non-budget-balanced policy under
the restriction of preserving budget-balance in all equilibria. More recently Harks et al. [2018] studied cost-
sharing in a model that imposes some constraints over the portions of the cost that can be shared among
the agents.
There is also a very close connection between network cost-sharing games and the very well-studied
class of congestion games (e.g., Rosenthal [1973], Milchtaich [1996], Monderer and Shapley [1996], Awerbuch
et al. [2005], Gairing and Schoppmann [2007], Bhawalkar et al. [2014], Harks and Klimm [2012], Harks et al.
[2011]). In particular, a congestion game can be interpreted as the game that arises from a network cost-
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sharing setting if the costs of the resources are divided equally among the agents. For instance, a congestion
game with cost functions that are polynomials of degree d can be cast as a network cost-sharing game with
costs that are polynomials of degree d+ 1 combined with the equal sharing protocol.
The impact of cost-sharing methods on the quality of equilibria has also been studied in other models:
Moulin and Shenker [2001] focused on participation games, while Moulin [2008] and Mosk-Aoyama and
Roughgarden [2009] studied queueing games. Also, very closely related in spirit is previous work on coordi-
nation mechanisms, beginning with the work of Christodoulou et al. [2009] and subsequently in the papers
of Immorlica et al. [2009], Azar et al. [2015], Caragiannis [2013], Abed and Huang [2012], Kollias [2013], Cole
et al. [2015], Christodoulou et al. [2014], Bhattacharya et al. [2014]. Most work on coordination mechanisms
concerns scheduling games and how the price of anarchy varies with the choice of local machine policies (i.e.,
the order in which to process jobs assigned to the same machine). Some connections between cost-sharing
policies and coordination mechanisms are also provided in Caragiannis et al. [2017].
3 Preliminaries
We study the performance of cost-sharing protocols on classes of network cost-sharing games. A class of
network cost-sharing games, Γ, is defined by a tuple (N ,G, C,÷), which comprises a universe of players N , a
universe of graphs G, a universe of cost functions C, and a cost-sharing protocol Ξ (formally defined later on).
An instance of a cost-sharing game Γ ∈ Γ then consists of a set of players N ⊆ N , a graph G = (V,E) ∈ G
where each edge e ∈ E is assigned a cost function ce drawn from C, and a cost-sharing protocol Ξ. Each
player i ∈ N is associated with a source si and a sink ti in the graph, and she needs to use a path in G that
connects them. For each edge e, the cost function ce(`) is a non-decreasing function that satisfies ce(0) = 0,
and indicates the cost of this edge when the load on this edge, i.e., the number of players using it, is `.
The outcome of a game is a strategy profile S = (S1, S2, ..., Sn), where Si is the path that player i chose to
connect her source and sink. For each edge e ∈ E, let `e(S) be the number of players using this edge in their
path, i.e., `e(S) = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ Si}|. The cost of e in this strategy profile is ce(`e(S)), and this cost needs
to be covered by the players using this edge. In this paper we design cost-sharing protocols, i.e., protocols
that decide how the cost of each edge will be distributed among its users. A cost-sharing protocol Ξ defines
at each strategy profile S a cost share ξie(S) for each edge e ∈ E and every agent i ∈ N that uses this edge
in S, i.e., such that e ∈ Si. For agents i with e /∈ Si we have ξie(S) = 0, so only the agents using an edge
are responsible for its costs. We denote the total cost-share of player i in S as
ξi(S) =
∑
e∈E
ξie(S).
Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE). The goal of every user is to minimize her cost-share, so different
cost-sharing protocols lead to different classes of games and, hence, to possibly very different outcomes. The
efficiency of a game, thus, crucially depends on the choice of the protocol. In evaluating the performance of
a cost-sharing protocol, we measure the quality of the pure Nash equilibria that arise in the games that it
induces. A strategy vector S is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of a game Γ if for every player i ∈ N , and
every other path S′i with the same source and sink as Si, we have
ξi(S) = ξi(Si,S−i) ≤ ξi(S′i,S−i),
where S−i denotes the vector of strategies for all players other than i. In other words, in a PNE no player can
decrease her cost share by unilaterally deviating from path Si to S
′
i if all the other players’ choices remain
fixed. In accordance with prior work, we restrict our attention to protocols that possess at least one PNE
for every Γ ∈ Γ, which are called stable protocols.
Price of Anarchy (PoA). To evaluate the efficiency of a strategy profile S, we use the total cost
C(S) =
∑
e∈E ce(`e(S)), and we quantify the performance of the cost-sharing protocol using the price of
anarchy measure. Given a cost-sharing protocol Ξ, the price of anarchy (PoA) of the induced class of games
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Γ = (N ,G, C,÷) is the worst-case ratio of equilibrium cost to optimal cost over all games in Γ. That is, if
Eq(Γ) is the set of pure Nash equilibria of the game Γ, and F (Γ) the set of all strategy profiles of Γ, then
PoA(Γ) = sup
Γ∈Γ
maxS∈Eq(Γ) C(S)
minS∗∈F (Γ) C(S∗)
.
Budget-balance and Overcharging. We say that a cost-sharing protocol is budget-balanced if for every
edge e and profile S we have
∑
i∈N ξie(S) = ce(`e(S)), i.e., the cost shares that the protocol distributes to
the players using an edge adds up to exactly the cost of that edge. Apart from budget-balanced mechanisms,
we also consider mechanisms that may use overcharging. These mechanisms define for each edge e a cost
function cˆ such that cˆe(`) > ce(`) for some values of `. As a result, the social cost of a given strategy profile
S may be increased from C(S) to Cˆ(S) =
∑
e∈E cˆe(`e(S)). In these mechanisms, we measure the quality of
the equilibria using the new costs, but we compare their performance to the optimal solutions based on the
original cost functions:
PoA(Γ) = sup
Γ∈Γ
maxS∈Eq(Γ) Cˆ(S)
minS∗∈F (Γ) C(S∗)
.
Classes of Games. We evaluate the price of anarchy for several classes of games that may differ in
the strategies of the players, the structure of the graph, or the cost functions used for the edges. We call a
cost-sharing game symmetric if all the players have the same source s and sink t, and hence the same set of
strategies (all the paths from s to t). Most of this paper focuses on symmetric cost-sharing games, but we
also consider games where players have different sources and the same sink, known as multicast cost-sharing
games. In terms of classes of graphs, the two main ones that we consider are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs)
and series-parallel graphs. The former include all directed graphs that do not have a cycle, while the latter are
defined recursively using two simple composition operations (see Section 5.1 for a formal definition). When
it comes to classes of cost functions, the two main ones that we consider are convex functions (exhibiting
non-decreasing marginal costs), or concave cost functions (exhibiting non-increasing marginal costs).
Informational Assumptions. Throughout this paper we focus on the design of resource-aware cost-
sharing protocols. The decisions of these protocols regarding how to share the cost of an edge e can depend
on the set of players using the edge, the structure of the network, and the cost functions of its machines,
but it cannot depend on the set of agents that are participating in the game, but are not using edge e. This
captures the intuition that these cost-sharing mechanisms are decentralized and are not aware of the set of
players that is using the network at any given time. On the other hand, since the structure of the network
and the characteristics of its edges are not expected to change radically, these protocols can be designed in a
way that leverages this information. This is in contrast to the class of oblivious protocols that are unaware
of anything other than the set of players that use the edge or the class of omniscient protocols that are
assumed to have access to all the information regarding the instance. In this paper we design resource-aware
protocols that take advantage of the additional information that they have access to (relative to oblivious
ones) in order to achieve good price of anarchy bounds in general classes of instances.
Global Ordering. Some of our mechanisms, as well as many protocols in the related work (e.g., Moulin
[1999], Christodoulou et al. [2017]), decide how to distribute the cost among the agents for a class of games
Γ = (N ,G, C,÷) by using a global ordering over the universe N of players. Then, for any instance Γ ∈ Γ
from this class with a set of players N ⊆ N , this global ordering also implies an ordering of the agents in
N that are actually participating. Based on a global ordering, we use he(S) to denote the highest priority
agent using edge e in strategy profile S, and we refer to her as the leader on this edge.
4 Directed Acyclic Graphs with Concave Cost Functions
In this section we consider a directed acyclic graph G with two designated vertices s and t, and concave
cost functions on the edges. We study symmetric n-player games where each player strives to establish a
connection from s to t. In Section 4.2 we define a family of protocols, which we call leader-based protocols,
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and in Section 4.3 we present our main result which is a leader-based protocol that uses overcharging and
achieves a PoA of almost 2.
We also provide some evidence that overcharging is needed in order to achieve constant PoA, if one
focuses on a subset of leader-based protocols that we call static-share leader-based protocols; we show (in
Section 4.4) that, even for strictly concave cost functions, no such budget-balanced protocol can achieve a
PoA better than Ω˜(
√
n). This is in contrast to the case of parallel links where prior work has shown that
such a protocol can achieve a PoA of 1 for strictly concave cost functions Christodoulou et al. [2017]. We
leave as an open question the existence of a budget-balanced leader-based (or any resource-aware) protocol
with constant PoA.
4.1 Structure of the Optimal Network
We first observe a property of the optimal solution, i.e., the assignment of users to paths that minimizes the
total cost, for symmetric games. Specifically, we show that when the cost functions are concave there always
exists an optimal solution where all the users are assigned to the same path connecting the source to the
sink.
Lemma 1. Let G be a graph with a designated source s and sink t, and with concave cost functions on the
edges. In any symmetric instance where all the users need to connect from s to t, there exists an optimal
solution which uses a single path from s to t for all the users.
Lemma 1 implies that for any graph G with source s and sink t, and any number of agents n, there exists
at least one path from s to t such that assigning all n players to that path minimizes the total cost. In fact,
note that we can easily find this optimal path for any number of agents, n, by computing the shortest path
from s to t assuming the cost of each edge e is equal to ce(n). The following definition provides us with a
way to consistently choose one of these paths, which will be useful in defining our protocols.
Definition 2. (OPT(`)). For a given symmetric instance, let OPT(`) be an optimal path from s to t when
the total load, i.e., the total number of agents in the system, is `. When there are multiple such paths,
OPT(`) breaks ties arbitrarily but consistently.
4.2 Leader-based Protocols
In this work we consider a class of protocols that we call leader-based protocols. The idea behind these
protocols is that for each edge we (consistently) identify a single player to be the leader and charge that
player some load-dependent amount ψe(`), while the rest of the players share the remaining cost equally. We
study resource-aware protocols, so the choice of the ψe(`) values may depend on the structure of the graph
and the cost functions of all the edges.
Definition 3. (Leader-based Protocol). Given a class of games Γ, a leader-based protocol uses a predeter-
mined priority ordering pi over the universe of players N . For any strategy profile S, the protocol identifies
a leader on each edge as the highest priority player (according to pi) using edge e, denoted as he(S). The
protocol further defines a value ψe(`) ≤ ce(`) for each edge e and load `. Then, for each strategy profile S,
the cost-share of player i for using edge e is
ξie(S) =
{
ψe(`e(S)) if i = he(S)
ce(`e(S))−ψe(`e(S))
`e(S)−1 otherwise.
We remark that the protocol used in Christodoulou et al. [2017] to achieve a PoA of 1 for parallel-link
graphs lies in the class of leader-based protocols, with ψe(`e(S)) being a fixed value when e ∈ OPT(`e(S))
and ψe(`e(S)) = ce(`e(S)) when e /∈ OPT(`e(S)). We call these protocols static-share leader-based protocols
and show in Section 4.4 that their PoA is Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
for DAGs. Note that OPT(`e(S)) corresponds to the
path that the optimal solution would use if the total load in the system was `e(S), and a resource-aware
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protocol has access to this information since it depends only on the graph and the edge costs; not on the
actual load in the system, which may be different than `e(S).
4.3 An Almost Efficient Leader-based Protocol with Overcharging
In this section we design a protocol that uses overcharging and has PoA = 2 + ε for an arbitrarily small
constant ε > 0; in fact, for instances with n > 1 users the PoA becomes 1 + ε. This protocol lies in the
family of leader-based protocols but it is not a static-share leader-based protocol. The main idea behind
this protocol is that the cost share that the leader pays for each edge decreases as the cost shares of the
other players increase. The cost share of the leader is infinitesimal when he is not the only one using an
edge and therefore he has an incentive to never be alone at any edge; for this reason, we call this protocol
the Never-Walk-Alone protocol.
Our protocol uses a property of DAGs, according to which we can assign weights on the edges such that
for any two paths with the same endpoints the sum of their edges’ weights are equal. Those weights are
used in order to guarantee that the charges of the leader are positive, and the equality between the weights
of alternative paths is used in our main theorem in order to compare the charges on those paths.
Lemma 4. Consider a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E). We can assign to each edge e ∈ E an integer
weight we > 0, and to each vertex v ∈ V a value ωv ≥ 0, such that for any two vertices u and v that are
connected through a path p in G, we have
∑
e∈p we = ωv − ωu.
Proof. Since G is a DAG, we can topologically sort the vertices in V so that all the edges are directed from
left to right. We assign to each vertex v a value ωv equal to its position in the sorted ordering, and to each
edge e = (u, v) we assign the integer weight we = ωv − ωu. Since the vertices are topologically sorted, for
every edge (u, v) we have ωu < ωv, which implies that we > 0 for every edge e. In other words, the weight
of each edge corresponds to the number of vertices ahead in the topological sorting it points to. It is then
easy to verify that for any two vertices, the sum of the weights of the edges for any path that connects them
will be exactly their “distance” in this topological ordering.
Never-Walk-Alone Protocol. Let OPT(d) be an optimal path from s to t when the total load is d
(according to Definition 2), let C > 2
∑
e ce(|N |) be an arbitrarily large number greater than the total cost
that may ever appear, and let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small value satisfying  < mine′{ce′(1)}/
∑
e we, where
we is the weight of each edge e implied by Lemma 4. The Never-Walk-Alone protocol defines a new cost
function cˆe for every edge e, satisfying cˆe(`) ≥ ce(`) for any load `, as follows:
cˆe(`) =

2ce(1) if ` = 1
2(`− 1)ce(`) + e(2ce(`)) if e /∈ OPT(`) and ` 6= 1
ce(`) + e
(
ce(`)
`−1
)
otherwise.
, where e(x) =
weC − x
C
 ,
Then, in order to decide how to share these new (overcharged) costs, the protocol considers a global
ordering pi over the universe of players, and for any strategy profile S it identifies a leader on each edge,
as the highest priority player he(S) using edge e. If there are at least two players using an edge, then the
cost of the leader is the second term of the costs defined in cases 2 and 3 above, and the rest of the players
equally share the remaining cost, i.e., the first term. In other words, for each strategy profile S, each player
i using edge e is charged:
ξie(S) =
{
ζe(`e(S)) if i 6= he(S) or `e(S) = 1
e(ζe(`e(S))) otherwise,
,
where ζe(`) =
{
2ce(`) if e /∈ OPT(`) or ` = 1
ce(`)
`−1 otherwise
.
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Note that C is used to guarantee that the leader does not pay a negative cost and  is used to keep that
overcharging arbitrarily small1 and to guarantee that the highest priority player has an incentive not to be
alone in any edge, unless the total number of players in the system is 1, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For every game with concave cost functions and at least two players, when we use the Never-
Walk-Alone protocol there is no Nash equilibrium S where the player h with the highest priority according
to pi, among all active agents, is the only user of some edge.
Proof. If player h chooses a path where he is alone in some edge, then he pays at least mine′{ce′(1)}. On
the other hand, if this player chooses a path where he shares every edge with some agent, he is charged at
most
∑
e e(0) ≥
∑
e e(x), for any x ≥ 0. Given the way we restricted  to satisfy  < mine′{ce′(1)}/
∑
e we,
we have mine′{ce′(1)} > me(0), so h always prefers to share. Therefore, since he always has the option of
sharing, e.g., by just following the path of some other player, a profile S where he is not sharing will never
be a Nash equilibrium.
A crucial subtlety in order to prove our main theorem is to guarantee that no ties appear in the charges
of alternative paths. We assume that the mechanism first applies some arbitrarily small overcharging using
the following lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) and then uses these cost functions in the
protocol definition.
Lemma 6. We can always increase the cost functions by adding arbitrarily small constants in a way that
for any two vertices u, v, any two paths p1 and p2 from u to v, and any strategy profiles S1, S2, we have∑
e∈p1
ζe(`e(S1)) 6=
∑
e∈p2
ζe(`e(S2)).
Lemma 7. The Never-Walk-Alone protocol is stable, i.e., it always induces games that possess a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. We show that for any number of agents, n, the optimal strategy profile S∗ in which all of the load
` = n is assigned to the optimal path OPT(`) is a pure Nash equilibrium. Consider any other path p and
let p′ and OPT′ be any two edge-disjoint sub-paths of p and OPT(`), respectively, with the same endpoints
u and v, as in Figure 1.
s u v t
OPT′
p′
Figure 1: Network structure if players use one path.
Suppose that ` > 1; the other case is trivial. If all the players use the OPT(`) path, then the cost share
of each of them (including the leader) for the OPT′(`) portion of this path is at most∑
e∈OPT′
ce(`)
`− 1 ≤
∑
e∈p′
ce(`)
`− 1 ≤
∑
e∈p′
ce(1)`
`− 1 ≤
∑
e∈p′
2ce(1),
where the last term is the cost share that any player should pay if they unilaterally deviate to p′. The first
inequality is due to the optimality of OPT(`) and the second due to the concavity of the cost functions.
Since this is true for any two edge-disjoint sub-paths of p and OPT(`), we conclude that no player has an
incentive to deviate to p.
1We remark that for any load ` > 1 and any e ∈ OPT(`) we can avoid even this small overcharging of 
(
ce(`)
`−1
)
by charging
all players but the leader ζe(`) =
ce(`)−we
`−1−/C instead of
ce(`)
`−1 and the leader is still charged e(ζe(`e(S))). For the sake of
simplicity we keep this small overcharging.
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Lemma 8. For any number of players n and any non-optimal strategy profile S in which all the players use
the same path p from s to t, S is not a Nash equilibrium of the Never-Walk-Alone protocol.
Proof. Similar to the previous proof, let p′ and OPT′ be two edge-disjoint sub-paths of p and OPT(`),
respectively, with the same endpoints (Figure 1); if there are many such paths, pick the one with total cost
for load ` = n strictly greater than that of OPT′ (there should be at least one, otherwise p would be an
optimal path). Based on the protocol, there is at least one player paying 2ce(`) for every edge e in p
′. Note
that ∑
e∈p′
2ce(`) <
∑
e∈OPT′
2ce(`) ≤
∑
e∈OPT′
2ce(1) ,
which is the cost share if a player deviates to OPT′. Hence, that player has an incentive to deviate from p′
to OPT′.
Lemma 9. For any strategy profile S in which players use at least two different paths, S is not a Nash
equilibrium of the Never-Walk-Alone protocol.
Proof. Aiming for a contradiction, assume that there exists some instance where such a strategy profile S is
a Nash equilibrium, and let a1 denote the highest priority player in this instance. Let p1 be the path that
the highest priority player is using in S, and let (v+, u) be the first edge along p1 such that some player,
denoted as a+, uses edge (v+, u) without having previously used all the previous edge in the p1 path; in
other words, a1 and a
+ use paths that differ by at least one edge in getting from s to v+ but they both use
edge (v+, u). If no such edge exists, then let v+ = t. Let p′1 be the sub-path of p1 from s to v
+ used by a1,
and p+ be the sub-path from s to v+ used by a+. Since no player enters p′1 before v
+ and due to Lemma 5,
which states that a1 is not alone in any edge under s, there must exist some other player a2 6= a1 that uses
all of the edges in p′1 (Figure 2).
a1, a2
a+
v+
s t
Figure 2: Network structure if players use at least two paths.
Since a2 is not the leader in any of the edges of p
′
1 (because a1 is), he is charged
∑
e∈p′1 ζe(`e(S)) for p
′
1.
If he deviated to follow p+ instead of p′1 he would be charged at most
∑
e∈p+ ζe(`e(S)+1). Since S is a Nash
equilibrium, a2 cannot improve his cost by deviating this way, so∑
e∈p′1
ζe(`e(S)) <
∑
e∈p+
ζe(`e(S) + 1) , (1)
where we have a strict inequality due to Lemma 6. However, since a1 is the highest priority player among
all players, his cost for p′1 under S is
(ωv+ − ωs)C −
∑
e∈p′1 ζe(`e(S))
C
 >
(ωv+ − ωs)C −
∑
e∈p+ ζe(`e(S) + 1)
C
 ,
where the inequality is due to (1) and the fact that
∑
e∈p′1 we =
∑
e∈p+ we = ωv+ − ωs. But, the right hand
side of this inequality would correspond to the cost of a1 if he deviates from p
′
1 to p
+. Therefore a1 has a
reason to deviate from p′1 to p
+ which contradicts the assumption that S is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 10. The PoA of the Never-Walk-Alone protocol for directed acyclic graphs with concave functions
is at most 2 + ε, for an arbitrarily small value ε > 0. If we assume n > 1, then PoA = 1 + ε.
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Proof. By Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 the only Nash equilibria are optimal paths so the PoA increases only due to
overcharging.
Recall that in order to avoid ties on players’ charges for alternative paths we increase the cost functions
by arbitrarily small amounts; let ε1 be the total such increment. Moreover, let ε2 =
∑
e e(0) be an upper
bound on the share that the highest priority player may ever pay in any Nash equilibrium. Note that ε2
depends on the choice of  and therefore can be arbitrarily small.
For n = 1 the overcharging trivially results in PoA ≤ 2 + ε1. For n > 1, the total charges of all but the
highest priority player sum up to the total cost occurred (after the increments for breaking ties on the cost
shares) and therefore, PoA ≤ 1 + ε1 + ε2.
4.4 Static-share Leader-based Protocols
In this section we argue that the approach of Christodoulou et al. [2017], which resulted in a budget-
balanced protocol for parallel links with PoA = 1, cannot be successfully applied here. The protocol used
in Christodoulou et al. [2017] is a leader-based protocol where, each edge essentially assumes that the set of
agents currently using it are the only active users in the system. If, given that assumption, the particular
edge should be used in the optimal solution, then the leader is charged some carefully chosen fixed cost,
otherwise, the leader is charged the whole cost of the edge, incentivizing that agent to deviate to another
edge. This is an instance of a class of protocols which we refer to as static-share leader-based protocols.
Definition 11. (Static-share Leader-based Protocol). A static-share leader-based protocol is a leader-based
protocol with the following choice of ψe ≤ ce(`):
ψe(`) =
{
ψe if e ∈ OPT(`)
ce(`) otherwise
We next show that no static-share leader-based protocol can guarantee a constant PoA. In particular,
the price of anarchy grows with the number of agents n = |N | of the instance at hand. Our proof considers
concave cost functions for simplicity, but we remark that the lower bound also holds for strictly concave cost
functions as we describe in the proof. Due to limited space the proof of this theorem can be found in the
appendix.
Theorem 12. Any static-share leader-based protocol has PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
for directed acyclic graphs, even
for the class of strictly concave cost functions.
5 Series-Parallel Graphs with Concave Cost Functions
In this section we study instances with series-parallel graphs and strictly concave cost functions and we are
able to design a budget-balanced static-share leader-based protocol with PoA = 1, which generalizes the
protocol used in Christodoulou et al. [2017] for parallel-link graphs. In fact, the same protocol extends to
general concave cost functions results with PoA = 1 + , for an arbitrarily small value  > 0, after applying
minor overcharging on the cost functions in order to transform them to strictly concave functions, similar to
Christodoulou et al. [2017].
5.1 Preliminaries in Series-Parallel Graphs
Here, we provide the basic definitions and properties of directed series-parallel graphs (SPGs), based on Epp-
stein [1992].
A series-parallel graph (SPG) can be constructed by performing series and parallel compositions of
smaller SPGs, starting with copies of the basic SPG which is an edge. Each SPG has two designated
vertices/terminals called source and sink; regarding the edge which is the basic SPG, one vertex serves as
the source and the other as the sink. One can construct any SPG through a (not unique) sequence of the
following operations:
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• Create a new graph, consisting of a single edge directed from s to t.
• Given two SPGs C1 and C2 with terminals s1, t1, s2, t2, form a new SPG C by merging s1 and s2
into one new terminal, s, and merging t1 and t2 into a new terminal, t. This is known as the parallel
composition of C1 and C2.
• Given two SPGs C1 and C2, with terminals s1, t1, s2, t2, form a new SPG C, with terminals s, t, by
merging t1 and s2 and identifying s = s1 and t = t2 as the new terminals. This is known as the series
composition of C1 and C2.
For the rest of the section we will consider a SPG G = (V,M), with source s and sink t, and C1, . . . , Cr
is the sequence of SPGs that are constructed in the process of generating G (with Cr = G). Let C =
{C1, . . . , Cr} and sC , tC be the terminals of any component C ∈ C.
5.2 An Efficient Leader-based Protocol
Here, we study symmetric games where each edge of G has a strictly concave cost function, and we present
a budget-balanced cost-sharing protocol with PoA = 1. In fact, as the following remark argues, this also
implies that we can achieve a PoA of 1 +  for weakly concave cost functions for an arbitrarily small constant
 > 0 if we use a very small amount of overcharging.
Remark 13. Using similar overcharging arguments like the one used in Christodoulou et al. [2017], one can
transform any concave cost function into a strictly concave one by replacing any linear portion of the function
with a concave portion that is never more than  times greater. This will achieve a PoA equal to 1+ , where
 > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
Protocol Definition. Like all leader-based protocols, this protocol uses a global order pi to identify the
leader he(S) of each edge for each profile S. After carefully assigning values ψe ≤ ce(`e(S)) on the edges of
G, the cost share of player i for using edge e is defined as
ξie(S) =

ce(`e(S)) if e /∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i = he(S)
0 if e /∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i 6= he(S)
ψe if e ∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i = he(S)
ce(`e(S))−ψe
`e(S)−1 if e ∈ OPT(`e(S)) and i 6= he(S)
In order to complete the definition of the cost-sharing protocol we need to define the ψe’s. In fact we
define a value ψC for each component C ∈ C = {C1, . . . , Cr}. This will be done iteratively starting from G
and following its decomposition in reverse order.
To capture essential information of the network structure, we first define the minimum load ` for which
some edge of component C ∈ C is used in the optimal path OPT(`).
Definition 14. (`∗C). Given a component C ∈ C of a SPG, we define `∗C to be the minimum total load such
that C is used in the optimal path OPT(`∗C), i.e., if EC is the set of the edges of C, `
∗
C = min{`|EC∩OPT(`) 6=
∅}.
Next we define the minimum cost required for connecting ` through C.
Definition 15. (φC). We define φC(`) to be the minimum cost for establishing a path that connects a load
of ` from the source, sC , of C to its sink, tC . Note that φC is a strictly concave function as the minimum of
strictly concave functions2. Trivially, for each edge e, φe = ce.
Remark 16. If C is constructed by the composition of C1 and C2, then if this is a
• parallel composition, `∗C ≤ `∗C1 , `∗C ≤ `∗C2 , φC(`) ≤ φC1(`), and φC(`) ≤ φC2(`) for any `.
2The cost of each path from s to t is a concave function as it is the summation of concave functions. Due to Lemma 1, the
optimal total cost for each ` equals the minimum cost among those paths.
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• series composition, `∗C = `∗C1 = `∗C2 and φC(`) = φC1(`) + φC2(`) for any `.
We now define ψC for each component C ∈ C so as to guarantee the following properties:
1. any two components that participate in a parallel composition have the same ψ value.
2. the ψ values of any two components that participate in a series composition sum up to the ψ value of
the composed component.
3. ψC >
φC(`)
` for any total load ` such that C is used in the optimal outcome OPT(`).
4. ψC ≤ φC(1).
The first two properties ensure that for each component C, we have ψC =
∑
e∈p ψe for any (acyclic)
path p from sC to tC . The third property guarantees that the highest priority player always pays more
than the rest of the players. Combined with the fact that all alternative paths have the same ψ, implied
by the first two properties, this allows us to show that no two paths can be used in any Nash equilibrium
(Theorem 23). Finally, the fourth property is crucial in ensuring that the optimal path is a Nash equilibrium;
if this inequality did not hold, the highest priority player could have an incentive to deviate to the path with
unit cost φC(1).
Definition 17. (ψC). We define the ψ values iteratively, starting from Cr (recall Cr = G) and following
its decomposition. We set ψCr to be equal to the minimum total cost when a unit load appears in G, i.e.
ψCr = φCr (1). Then, after defining a value ψC for a component C, we move on to define the ψC1 and ψC2
values of the two components C1, C2 whose composition led to C, as follows:
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition of C1 and C2, ψC1 = ψC2 = ψC .
• If C is constructed by a series composition of C1 and C2, then we consider two sub-cases:
– if φC1(1) < ψC
φC1 (`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
, then we let ψC1 = φC1(1) and ψC2 = ψC − ψC1 .
– if φC2(1) < ψC
φC2 (`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
, then we let ψC2 = φC2(1) and ψC1 = ψC − ψC2 .
– if φC1(1) ≥ ψC φC1 (`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
and φC2(1) ≥ ψC φC2 (`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
, then ψC1 = ψC
φC1 (`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
and ψC2 = ψC
φC2 (`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
.
Note that the ψC1 and ψC2 values as defined above always guarantee that ψC1 + ψC2 = ψC . To see
this note that φC1(`) + φC2(`) = φC(`) in a series composition (Remark 16).
In the next lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) we show that ψC ≤ φC(1) which, as we
mentioned above, is crucial for the optimal path to be a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 18. For any C ∈ C, ψC ≤ φC(1).
In the next lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) we show that ψC >
φC(`)
` for any ` that
C is used in the optimal path.
Lemma 19. For any C ∈ C and any ` ≥ `∗C with ` > 1, ψC > φC(`)` ; if `∗C = 1 then ψC = φC(1).
In the next lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix) we formally show that for each edge e,
the highest priority player pays at least ψe and the rest of the players pay strictly less than ψe. This lemma
will be used in a key argument in our main theorem (Theorem 23) in order to show that no two paths can
be used in any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 20. For any strategy profile S and any edge e, ξie(S) ≥ ψe if i = he(S) and ξie(S) < ψe otherwise.
In the next two lemmas we show that the protocol belongs in the class of budget-balanced and stable
protocols.
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Lemma 21. This static-share leader-based cost-sharing protocol is budget-balanced.
Proof. Consider any strategy profile S and any edge e. If e /∈ OPT(`e(S)) then the leader, he(S), covers
the whole cost and the rest of the shares are 0; therefore the protocol is budget-balanced for those edges. If
e ∈ OPT(`e(S)) and `e(S) > 1, by Lemma 18, the leader covers at most ce(1) (recall that φe = ce) and the
rest of the players cover the rest of the cost by definition. If e ∈ OPT(`e(S)) and `e(S) = 1, by Lemma 19,
the player is charged exactly ce(1).
Lemma 22. This static-share leader-based cost-sharing protocol is stable.
Proof. We show that for any load `, the profile where all players choose OPT(`) is a pure Nash equilibrium.
If ` = 1 then the optimal path has the minimum total cost and therefore that player has no incentive to
deviate. For the rest of the proof we assume that ` > 1.
Consider any alternative path p and let C ∈ C be any component composed by a parallel composition of
C1 and C2 such that OPT(`) uses C1 and p uses C2; let OPTC(`) and pC be the subpaths of OPT(`) and p
inside C, respectively3. If any player i deviates to p, she would be alone at pC and her cost share would be at
least φC(1) ≥ ψC (by Lemma 18). However, by Lemma 20, everybody pays at most
∑
e∈OPTC(`) ψe = ψC .
If we aggregate the cost shares over all such C (those components should be disjoint) we conclude that no
player can improve their cost share by choosing p instead of OPT(`).
Theorem 23. This static-share leader-based cost-sharing protocol has PoA = 1 for series-parallel graphs
with concave cost functions.
Proof. We will show that the only possible equilibrium is an optimal path. Consider any strategy profile S
of total load ` that is not an optimum and for the sake of contradiction assume that it is a Nash equilibrium.
S is a single path. If S is a single path p, there should be some component C ∈ C composed by a
parallel composition of C1 and C2 such that OPT(`) uses C1 and p uses C2; let OPTC(`) and pC be the
subpaths of OPT(`) and p inside C, respectively. If there are more than one such components, we choose
one with
∑
e∈pC ce(`) > φC(`); there should be such a component, otherwise S is optimum.
Let h be the highest priority player overall. For every e ∈ pC , it holds that e /∈ OPT(`) and therefore the
share of h equals to
∑
e∈pC ce(`) > φC(`) =
∑
e∈p∗C ce(`) ≥
∑
e∈OPTC(`) ce(1). So, player h has an incentive
to deviate from pC to OPTC(`) and hence S could not be a Nash equilibrium.
S is not a single path. Suppose now that S is not a single path. There should be some component C
composed by a parallel composition of C1 and C2 such that some nonzero load uses both C1 and C2 and it
uses only single paths p1 and p2 respectively
4. Let `1 and `2 be the loads using p1 and p2 respectively and
let h1 and h2 be the highest priority players in p1 and p2, respectively. W.l.o.g. suppose that h1 > h2.
By Lemma 20 h2 is charged at least ψe for edge e and therefore, he is charged at least ψC for the whole
path p2. If h2 deviates to p1 he will not be the highest priority player and, by Lemma 20, for any edge e ∈ p1
he would be charged strictly less than ψe and therefore strictly less than ψC for the whole path p1.Hence,
h2 has an incentive to deviate from p2 to p1, meaning that S could not be a Nash equilibrium.
Overall, we ended up with a contradiction showing that S cannot be a Nash equilibrium if it is not an
optimum. Hence, PoA = 1.
6 Multicast Games with Concave Cost Functions
In this section, we show that our positive results for symmetric games with concave cost functions cannot
be extended to the non-symmetric case of multicast network games, i.e., games where each agent i may
have a different source si that she needs to connect to the designated sink t. In particular we show that
even for constant cost functions, which are a special class of concave cost functions, resource-aware protocols
3There should be such a component with source vertex the first vertex that the two paths split and sink vertex the first
vertex that they merge again.
4If for any C1 or C2 the load doesn’t use a single path we look at the subcomponent where the structure splits until we find
the required component.
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cannot achieve a constant price of anarchy. Specifically the price of anarchy of any resource-aware protocol
grows with the number of agents n in the instance: we first show a linear lower bound for budget-balanced
resource-aware protocols, and then we extend it to protocols that allow overcharging, obtaining a lower
bound of
√
n.
t
s1 s2 s3 sn
v
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
c
Figure 3: A simple acyclic graph with a sink t and sources s1, s2, . . . , sn for each agent. All of the cost
functions are constant, i.e., the cost of the edge is zero if it is not used and some constant if it is used. The
direct edges from the sources to the sink have a constant cost of 1 and those from the sources to v have
a constant cost of 0. The cost of the edge connecting v to the sink is some constant c, which we define
appropriately for the proofs of Theorems 24 and 25.
Theorem 24. There is no resource-aware budget-balanced protocol that can achieve a PoA better than n
for the case of multicast networks with constant cost functions.
The proof follows directly from the instance of Proposition 4.12 of Chen et al. [2010] and the instance is
presented in Figure 3 where c should be 1. We give the complete proof in the appendix.
Theorem 25. There is no resource-aware protocol even with overcharging that can achieve a PoA better
than
√
n for the case of multicast networks with constant cost functions.
Proof. We again consider the graph of n+ 2 vertices from Figure 3, as in the previous proof, with the only
difference that the constant cost c of the (v, t) edge is set to be equal to
√
n. Note that this cost function
is constant and does not depend on the number of agents using it (its cost is zero if no agents use it and
equal to
√
n if at least one agent uses i). If the resource-aware protocol uses overcharging but the new costs
of the the (si, t) edges after the overcharging are no more than
√
n for all i, then we consider the instance
with n agents with sources s1, s2, . . . , sn and claim that the strategy profile where every one of these agent
uses their (si, t) edge is an equilibrium: a unilateral deviation through edge (v, t) would cost at least
√
n due
to the cost of (v, t), while every agent’s cost including the overcharging is at most
√
n. On the other hand,
if the resource-aware protocol increases the cost of an (si, t) edge above
√
n for some i, then consider the
alternative problem instance with the same graph, but with only one player, player i, in the system. Since
the resource-aware protocol that decides the cost of edge (si, t) cannot tell the difference between these two
instances, it would still increase the cost of that edge to above
√
n for this instance and force the agent to
pay a cost of
√
n. On the other hand, in the optimal solution for that instance agent i should just use the
(si, t) edge and pay a cost of 1.
7 Convex Cost Functions
For the rest of the paper, we now consider networks convex cost functions rather than concave ones. We first
prove that for convex cost functions, just like in the case of concave cost functions, there exists a budget-
balanced protocol with a PoA of 1 for series-parallel graphs. This protocol is the incremental cost-sharing
protocol introduced by Moulin Moulin [1999] and it is the same protocol used in Christodoulou et al. [2017]
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for parallel links. We note that this is an oblivious protocol, meaning that it requires no knowledge of the
instance other the number of agents using the edge at hand.
We complement this positive result by showing that in symmetric games on directed acyclic graphs any
resource-aware budget-balanced protocol has PoA = Ω(n). For protocols that use overcharging, we show
that optimality cannot be achieved, by showing a lower bound of 1.18, and we leave as an open question
the existence (or not) of a protocol that achieves a constant PoA with the use of overcharging. However, if
we consider games beyond ones that are symmetric, such as multicast network games, we provide a lower
bound of
√
n for all resource-aware protocols even with use of overcharging.
7.1 Series-Parallel Graphs
In this section we show that in series-parallel graphs (SPGs) with convex cost functions the incremental
cost-sharing protocol proposed by Moulin Moulin [1999] has PoA = 1. The incremental cost-sharing protocol
considers a global order pi of the players and defines the cost-share of each player i for using edge e to be
its marginal contribution if only players preceding him in pi were using e. For simplicity, for the rest of the
section we name the players based on the order pi.
Definition 26. (Prior Load `<ie (S)). Given a strategy profile S and an edge e, we define the prior load,
`<ie (S), for a player i using e to be the load on e due to players preceding i according to pi, i.e.,
`<ie (S) = |{k < i : e ∈ Sk}| .
Based on the definition of the prior load we can formally define the incremental cost-sharing protocol as
follows.
Definition 27. (Incremental Cost-Sharing Protocol). Given a strategy profile S, the cost share of player i
for using edge e is
ξie(S) = ce(`
<i
e (S) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S)) .
The following lemma is a key lemma in order to show that the incremental cost-sharing protocol has PoA
= 1. Due to space limitations, the proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 28. Given any Nash equilibrium S, there exists an optimal assignment S∗ such that for any player
i and any edge e ∈ S∗i , it holds that `<ie (S) ≤ `<ie (S∗).
Next we give a technical lemma to be used in our main theorem.
Lemma 29. Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn) be any Nash equilibrium under the incremental cost-sharing protocol and
S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n) be some optimal assignment satisfying Lemma 28. Then for any player i and any e ∈ S∗i
it holds that
ξie(S
∗
i ,S−i) ≤ ξie(S∗).
Proof. By the definition of the incremental cost-sharing protocol
ξie(S
∗
i ,S−i) = ce(`
<i
e (S
∗
i ,S−i) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S∗i ,S−i))
= ce(`
<i
e (S) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S)) (by the definition of `<ie (S))
≤ ce(`<ie (S∗) + 1)− ce(`<ie (S∗)) (due to Lemma 28 and convexity)
= ξie(S
∗).
Theorem 30. The incremental cost-sharing protocol has PoA = 1 in series-parallel graphs with convex cost
function.
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Proof. Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn) be any Nash equilibrium under this protocol and let S
∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n) be some
optimal assignment satisfying Lemma 28. Then,
C(S) =
∑
i
∑
e∈Si
ξie(S) ≤
∑
i
∑
e∈S∗i
ξie(S
∗
i ,S−i) ≤
∑
i
∑
e∈S∗i
ξie(S
∗) = C(S∗),
where the first inequality is due to the fact that S is a Nash equilibrium and the second inequality comes
from Lemma 29.
7.2 Directed Acyclic Graphs
In this section we consider symmetric games on directed acyclic graphs and prove a lower-bound of Ω(n)
on the PoA of all budget balanced resource-aware protocols. Then, we obtain a lower-bound of 1.18 for
protocols that allow overcharging.
Theorem 31. Any stable budget-balanced resource-aware cost-sharing protocol has PoA = Ω(n) for directed
acyclic graphs with convex cost functions.
Proof. We use the DAG shown in Figure 4 to prove the statement. In this graph all the players want to go
from s to t and the cost of each edge is either 0 or 1 if a single player uses the edge and infinity if more than
one players use it.
s
un vn un−1 v2 u1 v1
t
0,
∞
0,∞
0,∞
0,∞
0,∞
0,
∞
1,∞
0,∞1,∞
0,∞ 1,∞
Figure 4: An acyclic graph with a single source s and sink t. All of the cost functions are infinity for load
` ≥ 2. This graph is used to prove Theorem 31.
Considering n + 1 players, in the optimum, one player uses the (s, t) edge, and the others use sviuit
paths. The total cost of the optimum is n + 1. If any other strategy profile was an equilibrium it would
result in an unbounded total cost and give an unbounded PoA. Therefore, there should exist an optimum
strategy profile S∗ that is a Nash equilibrium. Assume w.l.o.g. that in S∗, player n+ 1 uses the (s, t) edge,
and for each i ≤ n, player i uses the sviuit path.
If we now consider the instance in which only the first n players use the network, the strategy profile in
which player i uses the sviuit path should also be an equilibrium. The reason is that since S
∗ is a Nash
equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate to any other path but the (s, t) edge, and obviously, no
player would prefer the (s, t) edge because she pays the same cost. The cost of this strategy profile is n.
However, the optimum with n players is for one player to use the (s, t) edge, and the others to use the
sviui−1t, for i ≥ 2 with total cost 1. This results in PoA = Ω(n).
In the following theorem we give a lower-bound of 1.18 for protocols that allow overcharging. The proof
can be found in the appendix.
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Theorem 32. There is no stable resource-aware cost-sharing mechanism with PoA <
√
33−1
4 ' 1.18, for
directed acyclic graphs with convex cost functions even with overcharging.
7.3 Multicast Games
Here we extend our lower-bounds to multicast games. We prove a lower-bound of
√
n even for protocols that
allow overcharging.
Theorem 33. There is no resource-aware protocol even with overcharging that can achieve a PoA better
than
√
n for the case of multicast networks with convex cost functions.
This lower bound is inspired by the lower bound we gave in Theorem 31. The difference is that the cost
of the (s, t) edge is
√
n for a single player and we use two sources s1 and s2, where from s2 there are only the
alternative paths, namely (s2, t) and s2v1u1t and all other paths start from s1. Then the costly equilibria
appeared in Theorem 31 can only be avoided by charging the player using path s2v1u1t at least
√
n. Then
if only that player appears in the system, he cannot avoid the
√
n charge whereas the original cost of the
optimum was 1. We give the complete proof in the appendix.
Acknowledgments
The work of the second author was supported by NSF grant CCF-1755955. Part of this work was done
when the third and fourth authors were employed by the Max-Planck-Institute for Informatics, Saarland
University Campus, Saarbru¨cken, Germany. The fourth author was supported by the Lise Meitner Award
Fellowship.
References
Fidaa Abed and Chien-Chung Huang. Preemptive coordination mechanisms for unrelated machines. In
European Symposium on Algorithms, pages 12–23. Springer, 2012.
Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Jon M. Kleinberg, E´va Tardos, Tom Wexler, and Tim Roughgarden.
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. SIAM J. Comput., 38(4):1602–1623,
2008.
Baruch Awerbuch, Yossi Azar, and Amir Epstein. The price of routing unsplittable flow. In ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, pages 57–66. ACM, 2005.
Yossi Azar, Lisa Fleischer, Kamal Jain, Vahab S. Mirrokni, and Zoya Svitkina. Optimal coordination
mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. Operations Research, 63(3):489–500, 2015.
Sayan Bhattacharya, Sungjin Im, Janardhan Kulkarni, and Kamesh Munagala. Coordination mechanisms
from (almost) all scheduling policies. In 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science,
pages 121–134. ACM, 2014.
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Martin Gairing, and Tim Roughgarden. Weighted congestion games: Price of anarchy,
universal worst-case examples, and tightness. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2(4):
14, 2014.
Ioannis Caragiannis. Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. Algorithmica, 66
(3):512–540, 2013.
Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Cosimo Vinci. Coordination mechanisms, cost-sharing, and ap-
proximation algorithms for scheduling. In Nikhil R. Devanur and Pinyan Lu, editors, Web and Internet
Economics - 13th International Conference, WINE 2017, Bangalore, India, December 17-20, 2017, Pro-
ceedings, volume 10660 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 74–87. Springer, 2017.
17
Ho-Lin Chen, Tim Roughgarden, and Gregory Valiant. Designing network protocols for good equilibria.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(5):1799–1832, 2010.
George Christodoulou and Alkmini Sgouritsa. Designing networks with good equilibria under uncertainty. In
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2016,
pages 72–89, 2016.
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, and Akash Nanavati. Coordination mechanisms. Theor. Comput.
Sci., 410(36):3327–3336, 2009.
George Christodoulou, Stefano Leonardi, and Alkmini Sgouritsa. Designing cost-sharing methods for
bayesian games. In Algorithmic Game Theory - 9th International Symposium, SAGT 2016, pages 327–339,
2016.
Giorgos Christodoulou, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Evangelia Pyrga. Improving the price of anarchy for selfish
routing via coordination mechanisms. Algorithmica, 69(3):619–640, 2014.
Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Alkmini Sgouritsa. Cost-sharing methods for scheduling games
under uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’17,
Cambridge, MA, USA, June 26-30, 2017, pages 441–458, 2017.
Richard Cole, Jose´ R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, and Neil Olver. Decentralized utilitarian
mechanisms for scheduling games. Games and Economic Behavior, 92:306–326, 2015.
David Eppstein. Parallel recognition of series-parallel graphs. Inf. Comput., 98(1):41–55, 1992. doi: 10.
1016/0890-5401(92)90041-D. URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0890-5401(92)90041-D.
Martin Gairing and Florian Schoppmann. Total latency in singleton congestion games. In Internet and
Network Economics, pages 381–387. Springer, 2007.
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, and Tim Roughgarden. Optimal cost-sharing in general resource
selection games. Operations Research, 64(6):1230–1238, 2016.
Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason R. Marden, and Adam Wierman. Potential games are necessary to
ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2014.
Tobias Harks and Max Klimm. On the existence of pure nash equilibria in weighted congestion games.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(3):419–436, 2012.
Tobias Harks and Konstantin Miller. The worst-case efficiency of cost sharing methods in resource allocation
games. Operations Research, 59(6):1491–1503, 2011.
Tobias Harks and Philipp von Falkenhausen. Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games.
Eur. J. Oper. Res., 239(1):187–198, 2014.
Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, and Rolf H. Mo¨hring. Characterizing the existence of potential functions in
weighted congestion games. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):46–70, 2011.
Tobias Harks, Martin Hoefer, Anja Huber, and Manuel Surek. Efficient black-box reductions for separable
cost sharing. In Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Christos Kaklamanis, Da´niel Marx, and Donald Sannella, editors,
45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2018, July 9-13, 2018,
Prague, Czech Republic, volume 107 of LIPIcs, pages 154:1–154:15. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
fu¨r Informatik, 2018.
Nicole Immorlica, Li Erran Li, Vahab S. Mirrokni, and Andreas S. Schulz. Coordination mechanisms for
selfish scheduling. Theoretical Computer Science, 410(17):1589–1598, 2009.
18
Konstantinos Kollias. Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines. Theory of Computing
Systems, 53(3):424–440, 2013.
Jason R. Marden and Adam Wierman. Distributed welfare games. Operations Research, 61(1):155–168,
2013.
Igal Milchtaich. Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions. Games and Economic Behavior, 13
(1):111–124, 1996.
Dov Monderer and Lloyd S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):124–143, 1996.
Damon Mosk-Aoyama and Tim Roughgarden. Worst-case efficiency analysis of queueing disciplines. In
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, pages 546–557. Springer, 2009.
Herve´ Moulin. Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness. Social Choice
and Welfare, 16(2):279–320, 1999. ISSN 1432-217X.
Herve´ Moulin. The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing. Economic Theory, 36
(3):379–405, 2008.
Herve´ Moulin and Scott J. Shenker. Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus
efficiency. Economic Theory, 18(3):511–533, 2001.
Robert W. Rosenthal. The network equilibrium problem in integers. Networks, 3(1):53–59, 1973.
Philipp von Falkenhausen and Tobias Harks. Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games. Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 38(1):184–208, 2013.
19
A Proofs Deferred from the Main Body of the Paper
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider any optimal allocation with at least two paths p1, p2 from s to t; if there is no such allocation
then all optimal allocations use single paths and the lemma follows. We next show that shifting one player
either from p1 to p2 or the other way around does not increase the total cost.
Let `e be the load at each edge e under the assumed optimal allocation. Suppose w.l.o.g. that∑
e∈p1
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) . (2)
By cancelling out common edges and using the concavity of the cost functions we get,∑
e∈p1rp2
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2rp1
(ce(`e + 1)− ce(`e)) . (3)
Next we show that shifting one player from p1 to p2 will not increase the total cost of the edges belonging
to p1 ∪ p2, hence the overall cost will not increase since the load on the rest of the edges remains intact. The
total cost of the edges in p1 ∪ p2 after a player shifts from p1 to p2 is equal to∑
e∈p1rp2
ce(`e − 1) +
∑
e∈p1∩p2
ce(`e) +
∑
e∈p2rp1
ce(`e + 1)
≤
∑
e∈p1rp2
ce(`e) +
∑
e∈p2rp1
ce(`e) +
∑
e∈p1∩p2
ce(`e) =
∑
e∈p1∪p2
ce(`e) , (by using (3))
where
∑
e∈p1∪p2 ce(`e) is the current total cost of the edges in p1 ∪ p2. Next we show that (2) still holds for
the new allocation. This implies that if all the players are shifted from p1 to p2 the cost will not increase
and therefore we can construct an optimal allocation with one less path. Working that way, we will end up
with a single path.
Let `′e be the new load on edge e after shifting a player from p1 to p2. Obviously, `
′
e ≤ `e for any e ∈ p1
and `′e ≥ `e for any e ∈ p2. Then, due to concavity,∑
e∈p1
(ce(`
′
e)− ce(`′e − 1)) ≥
∑
e∈p1
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2
(ce(`e)− ce(`e − 1)) ≥
∑
e∈p2
(ce(`
′
e)− ce(`′e − 1)) .
Therefore, (2) holds for the new allocation and the lemma follows.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let e1, . . . ek be all the edges and r be an arbitrarily big constant. At first, we round up all the costs
to r decimal places, i.e., for each edge e and load `, we round up ce(`) to the closest multiple of 10
−r. Then
we increase cei(`) by N !∞′−(∇+N !〉), where N is the maximum number of players ever appears. After these
increments, for any ei, any cost share ζe(`) has some non-zero values at decimal places from r+N !(〉−∞)+∞
to r + N !〉 and the rest of the decimal places greater than r have zero values. Since each edge appears at
most once in a path, the cost shares of two different paths are equal if and only if they have the same set of
edges.
Note that the increment at each edge is upper bounded by 10r and therefore can be arbitrarily small as
it only depends on the choice of r.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 12
Proof. In order to show this lower bound we construct a graph with appropriate edge cost functions. Consider
the graph of Figure 5 which is basically a Braess’s network with edge (s, u) replaced by multiple edges
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e1, . . . , er. The edges (v, u) and (u, t) have constant cost of 0 and 2k, respectively, for some integer k ≥ 6.
The cost of the edge (v, t) equals the load on that edge. For the rest of the edges we define the cost functions
as follows:
c0(`) =
{
` if ` ≤ k
k otherwise
, cj(`) =
`
jk2
+
Hj−1
k
+ εj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ r ,
where Hj is the harmonic number, i.e. Hj =
∑j
i=1 1/i, for j ≥ 1 and H0 = 0, and 0 < ε1 < ε2 < . . . < εr <
1
r2k2 are used to guarantee a single optimum for each `. r should be some integer such that cr(1) < 1; we
set r = 2k that satisfies this inequality if someone notice that H2k−1 ≤ k − 1 for k ≥ 6.5
s
u
v
t
c0(`)
c2(`
)
e2
0
`
2k
c3(
`)
e3
c1(
`)
e 1
cr(`
)
er
Figure 5: Graph where PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
for all static-share leader-based protocol.
For simplicity we denote by sv, vu, ut and vt, the edges (s, v), (v, u), (u, t) and (v, t), respectively.
Moreover, by svt we denote the path using edges sv and vt and similarly for the rest of the paths.
First note that, for ` ≤ k, c0(`) + ` ≤ 2k meaning that the only optimal path for that load is the svt. It
is not hard to verify that
c0(`) + ` > c1(`) + 2k , for ` ≥ k + 1 , (4)
cj(`) < cj+1(`) , for ` ≤ (j + 1)k , (5)
cj−1(`) > cj(`) , for ` ≥ jk + 1 , (6)
for all j ≥ 1. Inequality (4) indicates that for ` ≥ k+1 the path svt cannot be the optimum. Inequalities (5)
and (6) indicate that among all edges connecting s to u, ej has the minimum cost for jk+ 1 ≤ ` ≤ (j + 1)k.
Let `∗ be the minimum load such that cr(`∗) > k meaning that for ` ≥ `∗ the only optimal path is the svut;
note that `∗ > rk + 1. In Table 1 we summarize the optimal path for each load.
Consider now n = r2k2 players and any Nash equilibrium S of any static-share leader-based protocol.
We show that PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
First note that if more than n/2 players use some of the edges connecting s to u, due to concavity the
minimum cost occurred if all those players use the same edge (Lemma 1) and due to inequality (6) this edge
is er. Therefore, the total cost is at least cr(n/2) > r/2. It is easy to check that `
∗ ≤ r2k2 = n (recall that
5We remark that our result holds for strictly concave functions as well. To see this, one can add − /` to all cost functions
and verify that all arguments still hold for sufficiently small  > 0.
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` OPT(`)
[1, k] svt
[jk + 1, (j + 1)k], 1 ≤ j < r sut through ej
[rk + 1, `∗ − 1] sut through er
[`∗,∞) svut
Table 1: Optimal paths for the network of Figure 5.
`∗ is the minimum load such that cr(`∗) > k and r = 2k) and hence the optimum is for all players to use the
path svut with total cost 3k. So, PoA > r6k = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.6
Now for the rest of the proof suppose that at least n/2 players use sv under S. We distinguish between
three cases based on which path the highest priority player overall, h, uses in S.
h uses svt : If any edge connecting s to u is used under S, definitely one of its users is charged by at
least 1/rk2. If that player deviates from that edge to svu, he would pay at most 2/r2k as he wouldn’t be
the highest priority player in sv; h is. But, 2/r2k < 1/rk2, for k ≥ 6, meaning that S couldn’t be a Nash
equilibrium.
Therefore, only the paths svut and svt can be used in S. If `ut(S) ≤ k, then `vt(S) ≥ n− k resulting in
PoA > n/3k = Ω(n/ log n). So we consider at last the case that `ut(S) > k meaning that for any ` ≥ `ut(S),
ut ∈ OPT(`). First note that any player but h using vt pays either 1 or 0. The reason is that since
vt ∈ OPT(1), the ψvt defined by the protocol should be 1 so that it is budget-balanced. Similarly, ψsv = 1.
This further means that h is charged at least 2 for using svt. We take two cases on the value of ψut.
• ψut > 1: player hut pays more than 1 for the path vut and if he deviates from vut to vt he would pay
at most 1, as we mentioned above.
• ψut ≤ 1: player h currently pays at least 2 and if he deviates from svt to sut he would pay strictly
less than 2, since the unit cost of any edge connecting s to u is less than 1 and the charge for using ut
would be ψut since ut ∈ OPT(`eut(S) + 1).
Hence, S cannot be a Nash equilibrium in this case. Overall, if h uses svt, PoA = Ω(n/ log n).
h uses sut : Similarly as above, if `ut(S) ≤ 2k+ 1, PoA = Ω(n/ log n), so we assume that `ut(S) ≥ 2k+ 2.
If vt is used under S, then hvt pays at least 1 for vt whereas if he deviates from vt to vut he would pay less
than 1 since he is not the highest priority player, h is. Therefore, vt cannot be used in S, meaning that hsv
follows the path svut. It is easy to argue now that every edge connecting s to u is used under S, otherwise
hsv would have an incentive to deviate to the empty edge. This is because hsv pays at least 1 for sv and the
unit cost of any su edge is less than 1. By Claim 34 PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
h uses svut : In this case we can argue right away that every su edge is used under S, otherwise h would
have an incentive to deviate to the empty edge. Then again by Claim 34 PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
Claim 34. If n = r2k2 players appear and every su edge is used in some Nash equilibrium S, then PoA
= Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
6This is true because
√
n
log2 n
= rk
(log 22kk2)2
< rk
(log 2k)2
= r
k
.
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Proof. The total cost of S is at least
r−1∑
j=1
cj(1) ≥ 1
k
r−2∑
j=0
Hj =
1
log r
((r − 1)Hr−2 − (r − 2) = Θ(r) .7
The optimal total cost is 3k, which gives PoA = Ω
( √
n
log2 n
)
.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 18
Proof. We are going to prove this lemma by induction starting from G. For G the statement holds by
definition.
Suppose that ψC ≤ φC(1) for some C ∈ C. We will show that the statement also holds for its components
C1, C2 as well.
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition, for both i ∈ {1, 2}, it holds by Remark 16 that
ψCi = ψC ≤ φC(1) ≤ φCi(1).
• If C is constructed by a series composition, if the last case holds in the definition of ψCi , then the
statement trivially holds. If w.l.o.g. the first case holds then
ψC2 = ψC − ψC1 ≤ φC(1)− φC1(1) = φC2(1),
where the inequality holds by assumption and the last equality is due to Remark 16.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 19
Proof. We also prove this lemma by induction starting from G. For G by definition ψCr = φCr (1) and since
φCr is a strictly concave function ψCr >
φCr (`)
` for any ` > 1.
Suppose that the statement holds for some C ∈ C. We show that the statement also holds for its
components C1, C2 as well.
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition, for any i ∈ {1, 2}, we consider two cases:
– `∗Ci = 1: by Remark 16, `
∗
C = 1 and further φC(1) = φCi(1). By the definition of ψCi and the
assumption that C satisfies the lemma’s statement,
ψCi = ψC = φC(1) = φCi(1) .
– `∗Ci > 1: for any ` ≥ `∗Ci ,
ψCi = ψC >
φC(`
∗
Ci
)
`∗Ci
=
φCi(`
∗
Ci
)
`∗Ci
≥ φCi(`)
`
,
where the first inequality is because C satisfies the lemma’s statement for `∗Ci ≥ `∗C and `∗Ci > 1
(`∗Ci ≥ `∗C is true due to Remark 16). For the second equality note that if φC(`∗Ci) < φCi(`∗Ci) the
optimal path wouldn’t go through Ci, which contradicts the definition of `
∗
Ci
.
7We use the property
∑n
j=1Hj = (n+ 1)Hn − n.
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• If C is constructed by a series composition, then for any i ∈ {1, 2} we consider again two cases:
– `∗C = 1: it holds by assumtion that ψC = φC(1) and by Remark 16 that `
∗
Ci
= 1. Therefore, by
definition, ψCi = ψC
φCi (1)
φC(1)
= φCi(1), which is what is required for `
∗
Ci
= 1 .
– `∗C > 1: here it is either ψCi = φCi(1) >
φCi (`)
` for any ` > 1, or ψCi ≥ ψC
φCi (`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
. In the second
case:
ψCi ≥ ψC
φCi(`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
>
φC(`
∗
C)
`∗C
φCi(`
∗
C)
φC(`∗C)
=
φCi(`
∗
C)
`∗C
≥ φCi(`)
`
.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 20
Proof. We distinguish between two cases:
• e /∈ OPT(`e(S)): for i = he(S), ξie(S) = ce(`e(S)) ≥ ce(1) = φe(1) ≥ ψe by Lemma 18. The rest of the
players are charged 0.
• e ∈ OPT(`e(S)): for i = he(S) then ξie(S) = ψe by definition. If it exists i 6= he(s∗) then `e(S) > 1.
Additionally, since e ∈ OPT(`e(S)), `e(S) ≥ `∗e. By using Lemma 19 twice,
ξie(s
∗) =
ce(`e(S))− ψe
`e(S)− 1 <
ce(`e(S))− ce(`e(S))`e(S)
`e(S)− 1 =
ce(`e(S))
`e(S)
< ψe .
A.7 Proof of Theorem 24
Proof. This follows directly from the instance of Proposition 4.12 of Chen et al. [2010] and we include it only
for completeness. Consider an instance with n players, each one with a source si and a common sink t as in
Figure 3, and the constant edge costs are as they appear in the figure with the cost of the (v, t) edge being
equal to 1. It is easy to verify that the strategy profile where every player i uses the direct edge (si, t) to
get to the sink is an equilibrium for any budget-balanced resource-aware protocol. In particular, since there
is only a single player that uses each (si, t) edge, every budget-balanced protocol will need to charge each of
these agents a cost of 1. Any unilateral deviation would also cost them 1, however, due to the cost of (v, t).
In the optimal solution all agents share the (v, t) edge and the social cost is 1 instead of n.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 28
Proof. Starting from any optimum S∗ we swap subpaths of carefully selected players and end up to some
optimum satisfying the lemma’s statement. The swaps appear in rounds in each component starting from G
and following its decomposition (Cr, . . . , C1) (recall that G = Cr). We say that a strategy Si passes through
component C if it uses some of its edges.
For each component C (starting from Cr and reducing the index) we reallocate the optimum inside C by
using the following reallocation procedure:
• If C is constructed by a series composition, we do not do any reallocation and proceed to the next
component.
• If C is constructed by a parallel composition of C1 and C2, for players i from 1 to n, if
– both Si and S
∗
i pass through C,
– w.l.o.g. Si passes through C1 and S
∗
i passes through C2 and
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– there exists j > i such that S∗j passes through C1
switch the subpaths of S∗i and S
∗
j inside C
Note that after the above procedure, the new S∗ has the same total cost with the initial profile and
therefore is still an optimum. For the final optimum S∗ (after considering all components) we prove the
following claim.
Claim 35. For any player j and any component C that S∗j passes through, it holds that for any player i < j,
if Si passes through C so does S
∗
i .
Proof. We prove the claim by induction starting from G and following its decomposition. The claim is
trivially satisfied for G.
Suppose that component C satisfies the claim; we will show that also C1 and C2 that compose C satisfy
the claim. We distinguish between the two possible cases of how C was composed.
C is constructed by a series composition of C1,C2. It is easy to see that any path passes through
C should also passes through both C1 and C2 and therefore both C1, C2 satisfy the statement of the claim.
C is constructed by a parallel composition of C1,C2. For the sake of contradiction assume that
C1 doesn’t satisfy the statement and so there exists j and i with i < j and such that Si and S
∗
j pass through
C1 but not S
∗
i ; let i be the minimum such index. Since C satisfies the claim’s statement, S
∗
i should pass
through C and therefore through C2. Note though that while processing i during the round considering C
in the above reallocation procedure, there shouldn’t exist any S∗j′ with i < j
′ passes through C1 otherwise
S∗i should have been swapped with that; therefore there shouldn’t exist S
∗
j . However, since we assumed that
S∗j passes through C1 ultimately, it should have been swapped afterwards with some other optimal subpath,
but this proves the existence of some S∗j′ passing through C1 with i < j
′ < j while processing i.8 This is a
contradiction meaning that C1 should satisfy the statement as well.
Claim 35 holds for every edge e ∈ S∗i and trivially we get `<ie (S) ≤ `<ie (S∗).
A.9 Proof of Theorem 32
Proof. We use the DAG shown in Figure 6 to prove the statement. In this graph all the players want to go
from s to t and the cost of each edge is as indicated in the figure if a single player uses the edge and infinity
if more than one players use it.
s
v
u
t
√ 33−1
8
,∞
0,∞
0,∞
√ 33−1
8
,∞
0,
∞
1,∞
Figure 6: A simple acyclic graph with a single source s and sink t. All of the cost functions are infinity for
load ` ≥ 2. This graph is used to prove Theorem 32.
8Note that the order we process C’s in the reallocation procedure guarantees that any reallocation after processing C does
not affect the input of C, so S∗j cannot be swapped to pass through C1 after processing C.
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Considering three players a, b and c, in the optimum one player uses the upper edge, and the other two
the svt and the sut paths. The total cost of the optimum is
√
33−1
4 + 1. If any other strategy profile was an
equilibrium it would result in an unbounded total cost and give an unbounded PoA. Therefore, there should
exist an optimum strategy profile S∗ that it is a Nash equilibrium. Assume w.l.o.g. that in S∗, a uses the
upper edge, b uses the svt path, and c uses the sut path.
If we consider now the instance in which only b and c use the network, either the strategy profile in which
b uses the svt path, and c uses the sut path is an equilibrium, or one of b or c pays at least 1 in S∗ (due to
some overcharging). The reason is that since S∗ is a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate
to any other path but the upper one, and if neither b, nor c pays more than 1, obviously none of them would
prefer the upper edge.
For the first case, the cost of this strategy profile is
√
33−1
4 , and the optimum with two players is one
player to use the zig-zag path suvt, and the other to use the upper edge with total cost 1. This results in
PoA ≥
√
33−1
4 .
For the second case, if one of b or c pays at least 1 in S∗, the cost of S∗ becomes at least
√
33−1
8 + 2 and
we have
PoA ≥
√
33−1
8 + 2√
33−1
4 + 1
=
√
33− 1
4
.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 33
Proof. We use the graph shown in Figure 7 to prove the statement.
s1 s2
vnunvn−1un−1u2v1u1
t
0,∞
0,∞
0,∞
0,∞
0,
∞
0,
∞
0,∞
1,∞
0,∞
1,∞
1,∞
0,∞
√
n,∞
Figure 7: An acyclic graph with a two sources s1 and s2, and sink t. All of the cost functions are infinity
for load ` ≥ 2. This graph is used to prove Theorem 33.
We consider n+ 1 players, {1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1}, where the first n− 1 players want to connect s1 to t, and
players n, n+ 1 want to connect s2 to t. In the optimum, the paths s1viuit for 1 ≤ i < n, s2vnunt and s2t
are used. The total cost of the optimum is n+
√
n. If any other strategy profile was an equilibrium it would
result in an unbounded total cost and give an unbounded PoA. Therefore, there should exist an optimum
strategy profile S∗ that is a Nash equilibrium. Assume w.l.o.g. that in S∗, each player i < n uses the s1viuit
path, player n uses the s2vnunt path and player n+ 1 uses the edge s2t. Now we consider two cases:
Case 1: Player n is charged at most
√
n for the s2vnunt path.
In this case we consider the instance in which only the first n players use the network. The strategy
profile in which each player i < n uses the s1viuit path and player n uses the s2vnunt path should be an
equilibrium. The reason is that since S∗ is a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate to any
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other path but the s2t, and the only player that might have an incentive to do this is player n. Since player
n pays less than
√
n in s2vnunt, she does not have an incentive to deviate, and hence this strategy profile
is an equilibrium with the total cost of at least n. However, the optimal strategy profile for these players is
for each player i < n to use the s1viui+1t path (each with zero cost) and player n to use edge s2t with total
cost of
√
n. Therefore, PoA ≥ √n for this case.
Case 2: Player n is charged more than
√
n for the s2vnunt path.
In this case we consider a single player who wants to connect s2 to t. The optimal cost is 1 (considering
the original costs), but with the assumption that the player should pay at least
√
n, PoA ≥ √n in this case
too.
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